Abstract: In the newsvendor game, the expected-profit-maximizing order quantity is higher in the demand interval when the per-unit profit margin is high, and lower in the demand interval when the per-unit profit margin is low. However, laboratory experiments show a "pull-tocenter" effect: average order quantities are too low when they should be high and vice versa (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000) . We replicate this pull-to-center effect in laboratory experiments and construct an adaptive learning model that incorporates memory, reinforcement, and probabilistic choice to explain individual decisions. The intuition underlying the model's prediction is that the most recent demand observation is more likely to have been greater than the optimal order quantity if the optimal order quantity is low, in which case a recency bias tends to pull the order quantity upward. A countervailing downward pull exists if the optimal order quantity is high. The recency effect may be augmented by a reinforcement bias which causes subjects to focus more on the profitability of decisions they actually make and less on counterfactual payoffs that would have resulted from other order quantities. The predictions of this model track the observed data patterns across treatments. A pull-to-center pattern is also observed in designs involving doubled payoffs and reduced order frequency.
Introduction
This article evaluates the effect of learning and adaptive behavior on ordering decisions in the newsvendor game. This game involves purchasing units from a wholesaler at a constant cost to resell at a given price. Demand is unknown when orders are placed, and leftover units have no salvage value. In a classic laboratory study, Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) document a tendency for order quantities to be above optimal levels when the profit margin is relatively low, and below optimal levels when the profit margin is relatively high. The authors posit a number of explanations for this "pull-to-center" effect, such as risk aversion, risk seeking, loss avoidance, waste aversion, and underestimating opportunity costs, but they find theoretical reasons to doubt most of them. In their concluding discussion, they identify several promising heuristics that involve variants of anchoring and adjustment and a desire to avoid "ex post inventory error."
To see the intuition behind these heuristics, consider a person whose strategy in the game is to anchor on the previous order quantity and adjust towards the most recently-observed demand quantity. This "demand-chasing" behavior can have an asymmetric effect based upon the position of the optimal order quantity in the range of possible demands. When the optimal order quantity is low relative to the median demand, stock-outs are more likely than not if the optimal quantity is ordered. In this case, the most recent demand observation tends to generate a stock-out, and a "recency" bias that causes past events to be forgotten can cause order quantities to rise on average. Conversely, because losses from unsold units are more likely when the optimal order quantity is relatively high, the same recency effect could reduce order quantities below the optimal level. Similarly, if inventory errors tend to generate relatively high regret ex post, then choosing an order quantity more toward the center of the demand distribution could be appealing.
Randomness in decision making may be another factor in the less-than-optimal responsiveness of orders to different costs. Randomness can be due to unmodeled or unobservable factors such as emotions, or it can result from bounded rationality (e.g., calculation and recording errors, or limited memory or attention spans). From the econometrician's perspective, highly random environments tend to spread out decisions uniformly, a fact which would necessarily pull average order quantities towards the center of the range of possible decisions. At an aggregate level, this kind of randomness can be modeled by assuming that individuals anchor on mean demand and noisily adjust only partially towards the optimal order quantity, or by a discrete-choice model more closely tied to individual decision theory. Similarly, a rapid-1 For example, Goeree and Holt (2005) use a logit discrete-choice model to explain a pull-to-center effect that has been observed in some market entry and political participation experiments. 2 For example, if a risky decision yields a series of losses and gains, and if the losses have a greater psychological impact, then the presence of losses may cause less risk-taking to occur when decisions are made at high frequency. If decisions were made infrequently, losses and gains would tend to average out. This "myopic loss aversion" has decision environment does not permit inventory errors to balance out over time, a setting which could invite a regret-avoidance bias. Thus, it has been suggested that the effects of recency and regret might be mitigated by reducing decision frequency. However, there is potentially an opposite tendency because lowering the decision frequency does not provide the decision maker with as many opportunities to experiment and learn from mistakes. Bolton and Katok (forthcoming) and Lurie and Swaminathan (2007) observe that reduced decision frequency results in order quantities that are closer to optimal predictions in some treatments, although the latter note that the degree of variability of the environment has some effect upon this tendency. 3 In this article, we evaluate the effects of learning behavior using three laboratory designs that vary the frequency of information feedback and order decisions. Using data from the design involving high-frequency decisions, we estimate several models based on the leading decision heuristics suggested by Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) : (1) anchoring on mean demand and partially adjusting towards the optimal order, (2) anchoring on the most recent order quantity and partially adjusting towards the most recent demand observation, and (3) maximizing a utility function that is linear in profit but includes a penalty for ex post inventory errors in either direction. Because none of these models unifies the learning and treatment effects observed in our data, we also estimate a learning model inspired by the experience-weighted attraction model of Camerer and Ho (1999) . This model permits noisy adjustment with recency and reinforcement effects, and includes expected-profit-maximizing behavior as a special case. An important feature of the model is that it generates learning and treatment effects from a single set of parameters. Indeed, the predictions from the fitted model exhibit trends similar to those observed in our data, including the pull to center. We repeat the estimation using data from a second design involving low-frequency decisions. In this experiment, we find a faster reduction in bias on a decision-by-decision basis because each decision can incorporate five times as much information. But, of course, decisions are less frequent in this second design, and so the bias actually disappears at a slower rate over time. Thus, we find a strong pull to center at the low been observed in laboratory experiments that alter the frequency of decisions and information feedback (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2003; Haigh and List, 2005; Thaler et al., 1997) . Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) show that the effect of loss aversion in the newsvendor problem is to reduce order quantities uniformly, so loss aversion alone cannot explain the pull-to-center effect in this experiment. In fact, the same effect is present in one of their designs in which a demand shift precluded the possibility of losses.
order frequency as well as at the high order frequency. The pull-to-center effect is also not diminished in sessions involving doubled payoffs.
A Baseline Experiment
Consider a version of the newsvendor game in which the retail demand for the product is uniform over [0, X] and unsold units have no salvage value. Units are ordered at an exogenous per-unit cost c and are sold at an exogenous per-unit price p. When calculating the expected sales quantity for an order of x units, it is convenient to separate the two probabilistic events of being understocked (sales below x) and stocked-out (potential sales greater than x). The uniform-distribution assumption admits an intuitive formula (1) for expected sales. The probability of a stock-out is 1 -x/X, in which case x units are sold; the product of these elements yields the first two terms on the right-hand side of (1). The third term addresses the understock condition: the probability of being understocked is x/X, in which case x/2 units will be sold on average.
(1)
The expected profit function is the price times the expected sales quantity in (1), minus the order cost:
where the expectation is taken with respect to the random demand d. Expected profits are maximized at an order quantity of x * = X(p -c)/p. The quadratic payoff structure results from the linear nature of the payoffs and the uniform demand distribution, a scenario which is easy to describe to subjects in an experiment. However, a secondary consequence is that the profit function can be relatively flat in the neighborhood of x * for some values of p and c. Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) report laboratory experiments that use this payoff structure. In their baseline design with X = 300 and p = 12 "francs," they construct two treatments by setting the wholesale cost at c = 3 and c = 9 francs. (The conversion rate between experimental francs and real dollars is 300 to 1, which corresponds to a price of $0. were informed that each integer demand quantity in the range 1 to 100 would be equally likely, and that the demand realization in a round would be independent of those from previous rounds.
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Thus, the treatments involving c = 1¢ and c = 3¢ have direct analogs to Schweitzer and Cachon 4 Participants were recruited from undergraduate economics classes at the University of Virginia, with the promise that they would each be paid $6 on arrival and that any subsequent earnings would be paid in cash. The sessions were run using the Veconlab web-based experimental platform, which generated instructions on the fly to conform to the selected design. The interested reader can visit the administration site to view the setup details (http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/admin.php, under the "Markets" category) and the participation site to log into a session that has been set up (http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/login.php).
Subjects in our experiments were asked to "imagine a hard spin of a roulette wheel with 100 stops marked from 1 to 100, with each stop being equally likely." (2000) treatments. 6 In each round, subjects observed the amounts they actually sold after they made their decisions (but not how much they could have sold, if they were understocked), and received earnings results for the current round before moving to the next round. The average order quantities over all rounds are 66 = x in the low-cost treatment (N = 22 subjects), 52 = x in the medium-cost treatment (N = 36), and 39 = x in the high-cost treatment (N = 24).
There are interesting differences and similarities between the patterns in Figure 1 and the Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) results.
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First, by just examining the grand means, we observe a slightly weaker pull to center. This is due to the fact that Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) observe strong treatment effects in the initial decision, with order averages remaining almost perfectly flat afterwards; in contrast, we observe initial decisions clustered around the midpoint of the demand distribution, which then move towards the optima. In our data, the median round-1 order quantity is exactly 50 in all three treatments. There is no significant difference between the round-1 decisions and the demand midpoint of 50 in the low-and medium-cost treatments We added the intermediate c = 2¢ treatment for several reasons. First, this treatment serves as a baseline calibration check for systematic upward or downward biases in order quantities. It also allows a comparison of dynamic models in the absence of systematic trends. At the subject level, it permits us to test whether simplistic anchoring on the middle of the demand distribution is a sufficient explanation of overall decision-making behavior when the optimal choice is deliberately pulled to center, or whether subjects are responding to historical patterns of realized demands.
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Some differences are not surprising given the procedural differences. For example, Schweitzer and Cachon's subjects were MBA students who had taken or were taking operations management; our subjects were undergraduates recruited from various economics classes. We paid all subjects their earnings in cash, whereas they paid one person randomly selected from each cohort. In addition, all subjects in a Schweitzer and Cachon treatment encountered the same sequence of demand realizations, while we gave each subject a unique string of demands. Finally, no decision props or computer-assisted probability calculations were provided in our experiments; Schweitzer and Cachon observed a strong pull-to-center effect even when such assistance was made available to subjects.
= 25 for the high-cost treatment (p = 0.00) but not significantly below x * = 75 for the low-cost treatment (p = 0.24). To summarize, like Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) , we observe a pull-tocenter effect with an asymmetry. But, the data in our experiment are initially clustered near the midpoint of demand, with average order quantities evolving towards optimal levels.
The flatness of the expected profit function in the neighborhood of x * implies a low average payoff penalty for choosing an order quantity that is merely close to the optimum. As a result, subjects may not have an economic incentive to be very circumspect in their decisions, and so lazy decision-making could possibly explain the pull-to-center effect. To evaluate this hypothesis, we ran two additional designs which doubled p and c in the low-and high-cost treatments. This change does not affect the optimal order quantities, but it does make the economic consequences of understocking or stocking-out twice as severe. 
Models of Learning and Adjustment
In modeling our data, we first consider three heuristics identified by Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) in their concluding discussion as showing the most promise for explaining their results. The first is the mean anchor heuristic, which "assumes that a decision maker anchors on mean demand and adjusts toward the optimal order quantity… ." We operationalize this as a linear partial adjustment model:
The parameter α reflects the degree of rationality, i.e., the extent to which subjects deviate from the median demand d towards the optimal order x*. For econometric purposes, we append an i.i.d. normal error term ε t . Note that this model does not predict any systematic trends, although it does predict a treatment effect with a pull-to-center pattern because x* differs across the three treatments.
A second approach is a preference for minimizing ex post inventory error, which "could develop from the decision maker's anticipated regret or disappointment from not choosing the ex post optimal order quantity (realized demand) even though that order quantity is rarely the ex ante optimal order quantity…." This random-utility model attaches a "regret" term to the profit function which increases with the magnitude of the inventory error:
Again, the expectation is taken with respect to the random demand d. The parameter δ is the degree to which missing demand induces regret. Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) allow this second term to be any increasing function of the absolute inventory error. For purposes of estimation, we use the quadratic parameterization. Again, deviations from this rule are captured by the error term ε t which is assumed to be i.i.d. double exponential, yielding logit choice probabilities for each choice x i . Since the expected payoff in the first term is affected by the 8 When estimating this model, we examined integer powers from 1 to 5 and found that powers of 1 (linear regret) and 2 (quadratic regret) perform almost identically in likelihood terms, while powers higher than 2 both fit worse and significantly attenuate the regret effect for smaller values of | x -d |.
profit margin, this model has a treatment effect but no trend because it is based solely on the anticipated effects of the choice in the current period. Also, since the expected inventory error is minimized at the midpoint of demand, this model will generate a pull-to-center effect.
The third approach is the demand-chasing heuristic, in which subjects anchor on the previous order quantity and adjust towards the most recent demand observation. Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) report that order changes were more than twice as likely to be in the direction of the last demand quantity as in the opposite direction. As before, we operationalize this heuristic in terms of a partial-adjustment model:
The parameter β represents the degree to which subjects move towards the most recent demand observation relative to their last choice, with β = 1 implying full demand chasing. (Recall that demand d t-1 is observed only after choice x t-1 is made.) Deviations from demand-chasing behavior are reflected in the error term ε t , which is assumed to be i.i.d. normal. This model is dynamic, unlike the previous two models, but its predictions are independent of the cost treatment. Demand chasing, however, is appealing because it provides an intuitive description of behavioral adjustments. As noted in Section 1, demand chasing tends to pull orders down when they are high in the demand interval, and to pull them up otherwise.
Although these three heuristics generate a pull to center, none of them displays the evolution of choices towards the optimum. One way to capture these learning effects while retaining the Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) framework is to make the bias parameters timevarying.
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To this end, we extend the three models by adding autoregressive dynamics to the bias parameters. For example, the insufficient-adjustment parameter α from the mean anchor heuristic becomes α t , where
and ∆ α and α 1 are to be estimated. The parameter ∆ α is the percentage increase or decrease in the insufficient-adjustment bias from round to round; if this bias is indeed diminishing due to 9 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
learning, ∆ α should be positive and α t should converge to 1 (implying no bias). A similar intuition holds for the demand-chasing and ex post regret parameters β t and δ t , except that the sign of ∆ is reversed causing β t and δ t to approach 0 (implying no bias).
These dynamic Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) heuristics are reduced-form perspectives on learning: a bias exists and disappears at some rate over time. An alternative is to more concretely describe the mental processes that might cause the biases. We incorporate some of the insights from the heuristics into a dynamic model of learning and adjustment with bounded rationality. Since our subjects were provided with full information about the demand process, what was being learned in this experiment is the shape of the expected profit function, i.e., which order quantities tend to generate the best payoffs in the long run. It is useful to think of each possible order quantity as possessing an "attractiveness" that increases or decreases over time with the subject's experience, an approach known as experience-weighted attraction learning (Camerer and Ho, 1999) . In this framework, each possible order quantity in X = {0, 1, ..., 100}
receives a weight that determines its probability of being chosen.
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The weight w t (x i ) at round t for a particular choice x i is a function of the prior weight on that choice and the counterfactual profit π*(x i , d t ), i.e., the profit that would have been generated by choosing x i given the observed demand d t :
Think of ρ as a memory parameter, so that ρ = 0 implies that subjects only consider the current counterfactual profits and ignore their historical performance in the game. As the memory parameter approaches 1, past and present are remembered equally; an application of L'Hôpital's rule shows that the weight on the most recent counterfactual profits converges to 1/(t + 1), or period t's long-run "share" of the previous counterfactual payoffs and the round-0 prior weights.
With a memory parameter near 1 and a long history of demand realizations, the average of the historical counterfactual profit functions converges to the expected profit function.
Our data show a quite a bit of inertia once subjects decide upon satisfactory strategies.
To capture this inertia, we incorporated an element of reinforcement learning that has been used 10 An order quantity of 0 was a permissible choice, but it was made only 3 times out of all 2460 choices in Experiment 1.
to explain behavior in a number of economic games, such as coordination and bargaining (e.g., Erev and Rapoport, 1998; Slonim and Roth, 1998; Camerer and Ho, 1999) . Note that the counterfactual profit function for a particular realization of d t is kinked: the peak is at x i = d t and the profit then decreases linearly on either side, with the slope depending on the profit margin and the cost. In the reinforcement mechanism, one point on this counterfactual profit function is particularly focal: the payoff for the order quantity x t actually chosen. Following Camerer and Ho (1999) , we define the reinforced counterfactual payoff as
where 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 reflects the reinforcement bias. A reinforcement of 0 implies that subjects pay equal attention to the profitability of all choices they could have made under the current demand realization. A reinforcement of 1 (pure reinforcement learning) implies that subjects only respond to the effects of the actual decision made and ignore all other alternatives. With high reinforcement bias, a decision that yields a positive payoff is more likely to be used again regardless of the profitability of other decisions, a characteristic which can generate inertia.
Finally, the weights constructed with equations (7) and (8) determine logit probabilities of making choice x i in round t + 1:
where λ indicates the level of rationality.
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As λ approaches ∞, subjects make choices perfectly in accordance with the learning model. This model is derived similarly to the random-utility model described earlier by adding an i.i.d. double-exponential error ε it to each weight. The probability of choosing xi in round t +1 is the probability that wt(xi) + ε it is the greatest random weight, which reduces to the logit distribution.
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It is straightforward but tedious to show that, with full memory, the resulting limiting distribution is a truncated normal distribution with a mode at the optimal order quantity, so the longer tail for the asymmetric cost treatments would pull the mean towards the center. The interested reader can verify this by substituting the quadratic payoff expression (2) into the exponential function in the numerator of (9) and completing the square -the result is a normal density with the desired mean and a variance equal to λ As indicated by the time subscripts in (9), the initial weight w 0 (x i ) determines the round-1 probability for choosing some quantity x i . Then, the realized demand d 1 for round 1 together with w 0 (x i ) determines the round-1 "exit weight" w 1 (x i ). The exit weights generate the decision probability Pr t+1 (x i ) for x i in round 2. So, in general, the round-t demand d t is used in conjunction with the round-(t -1) weights w t-1 (x i ) to determine the round-t exit weights w t (x i ), and these exit weights then affect the round-(t + 1) order decision. The starting weights w 0 are of some concern, because they determine the initial path of decisions. Recall that in our data, the mean round-1 choice is near 50 and the median is exactly 50 in each treatment. This feature can be replicated in the learning model by assuming that subjects are initially "level-0" players, in the sense that the starting weights are all equal. This assumption creates an average initial prediction of exactly 50 for all treatments, but it also implies a large variance in initial decisions. An alternative "level-1" approach is to initially anchor on the expected demand of 50, calculate counterfactual profits from this anchor, and use this counterfactual profit function as the starting weights. This function is maximized at 50 and has potentially unequal slopes on either side of 50 depending on the treatment. This procedure imputes a mode of 50 to the starting weights, but the means are pulled about 6 units in the direction of x * in the low-and high-cost treatments, and so the initial pull to center is not as strong as in the level-0 specification. We estimate the learning model using both assumptions.
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To summarize our learning model, the reinforcement parameter r determines the extent to which actual payoffs dominate counterfactual payoffs for choices not made, and the memory parameter ρ determines the extent to which counterfactual profits from prior periods affect the weights for each order decision. Thus, operating purely in isolation, ρ captures time-series effects and r cross-sectional effects of the weight evolution, though clearly their interaction is critical to the learning process. The logit precision parameter λ determines the sensitivity of the choice probabilities to differences in weights.
It is difficult to analytically derive marginal effects for the three learning parameters, so we offer some comparative-static simulations instead. Tables 1, 2 , and 3 present three simulation exercises using level-0 prior weights. Each newsvendor treatment is simulated 100 times under the learning model holding two parameters at rational values and varying the third; 13 Both assumptions about w0 have been previously utilized in learning models. For example, the attraction model described by Arifovic and Ledyard (2005) uses the level-0 assumption, while the "self-tuning" version of experienced-weighted attraction learning in Ho et al. (2007) uses a level of about 1.5 in a cognitive hierarchy model for games with multiple players. the round-30 order decision averages are reported in the tables. The simulated demand in each round is a randomly-generated integer from the uniform distribution over [1, 100] , and choices in each round are made by randomly sampling from the logit distribution over order quantities.
These simulations show the potential for a pull-to-center effect caused by limited memory (Table   1) or by decreasing rationality (Table 3) . Increasing reinforcement tends to pull orders down uniformly (Table 2) . Even though memory and rationality biases yield similar qualitative results, the operation of these effects is different: low values of λ uniformly spread out order decisions over the whole demand interval, while low values of ρ introduce high round-to-round variability. As noted previously, this variability can be reduced by reinforcement. These observations raise the question of which effects matter most, an issue that will be addressed in the next section.
These simulations also underscore how the learning model can incorporate some elements of the Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) heuristics. In the absence of any reinforcement, the effect of decreases in the rationality and memory parameters is to spread out the average orders away from the optimum, so that ρ (or λ) roughly corresponds to some level of the partialadjustment parameter α in the insufficient-adjustment model. Also, with low reinforcement and low memory, the highest attraction will correspond to the most recent demand quantity; when coupled with high rationality, this scenario results in an order at the previous demand, or a demand-chasing parameter β near 1.
IV. Estimation
The parameters ρ, r, and λ of the learning model were estimated by maximum likelihood.
The likelihood function of this model is the product of the logit probabilities for the observed order decisions for all subjects for all rounds. Table 4 presents the parameter estimates and standard errors for each treatment and for the pooled dataset under the level-0 and level-1 priors.
All parameter estimates are highly significant and are reasonably stable across treatments. As shown by the difference in log-likelihoods, the level-0 assumption generates a uniformly better fit than the level-1 assumption, but the learning parameters are relatively consistent under both priors. Table 3 indicates that subjects are behaving quite rationally with respect to this learning model. Parameter estimates for the models based on the three Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) heuristics are estimated in Tables 5, 6 , and 7. For the insufficient-adjustment and demandchasing models reported in Tables 5 and 6 , the likelihood function is a product of normal densities. The likelihood function for the ex post inventory error model in Table 7 is a product of logit probabilities.
The pooled estimate α = 0.53 from Table 5 implies that subjects adjust only about halfway between median demand and the optimal order quantity. However, the time-varying version of this insufficient-adjustment model indicates that subjects initially only adjust one third of this distance in round 1, while they adjust two thirds of the way by round 30 (as shown in the α 30 row in the table). The instability in the estimate of the partial-adjustment parameter α across treatments is caused by the asymmetry effect in the data. The pooled estimate β = 0.15 from Table 6 implies that a 10-unit difference between the previous choice and the previous demand generates a 1.5-unit change in quantity, which is rather a sluggish demand-chasing response. The time-varying version of this model indicates that demand chasing also falls over time: subjects initially adjust 2.6 units for every 10-unit difference, and by round 30 they only adjust 0.9 units. This effect is relatively stable across treatments, and it suggests that subjects are "locking onto" strategies and becoming less responsive to demand realizations as the experiment progresses. Finally, the pooled estimate of δ = 1.17 × 10 -4
from Table 7 indicates that a 10-unit inventory error generates 0.01 in anticipated regret and a 50-unit inventory error difference causes 0.29 in anticipated regret. Since the scale of the utility function is in dollars (recall that the utility function is profit minus anticipated regret), this anticipatory effect is quite small. It is possible that subjects view understocking and overstocking regret differently, and so we also estimated the ex post regret model using two regret parameters, one for each case. Understocking caused about twice as much regret as the overstocking. However, the estimates of the regret parameters were still on the order of 10 . A characteristic common to all models is their large error variances, which indicate a significant amount of uncaptured data variation. We also estimated these models using only the first 15 rounds of data, which corresponds to the duration in the Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) design. The estimates between the full and partial datasets are remarkably similarthey are almost uniformly identical at the first significant digit and sometimes at the second as well. The difference in the precision estimates is larger but the effect on the logit probabilities is minimal. The insufficient-adjustment and ex post inventory error results are alike in one regard: their bias estimates vary by treatment. The demand-chasing results, on the other hand, are more consistent across treatments. The learning model parameters are also relatively stable, though it is difficult to translate variability in parameter values into outcomes in that case. Table 8 lists the correlations between the predictions of the various models.
15

16
(All are highly significant using the Spearman test.) It appears that the time-varying heuristic models are only very slightly different from their static-parameter counterparts. In addition, the insufficient-adjustment and ex post inventory error models are nearly the same; in fact, we might regard the latter as a structural representation of the insufficient-adjustment heuristic. However, the demand-chasing heuristic is not highly correlated with these two, indicating that it is indeed detecting a different effect. Most 16 For the logit models, the prediction for individual n's order quantity in round t is the expected choice given the logit probabilities for that round:
For the linear models, the prediction nt x is simply the model expectation. Pooled parameter estimates are used throughout to generate predictions. importantly, the learning models correlate well with all of the heuristics, indicating that they can detect both the treatment effect described by the insufficient-adjustment and ex post inventory error heuristics as well as the dynamic pattern of adjustment described by the demand-chasing model. 
where k is the number of parameters in the model, N is the number of subjects in the panel, and T is the number of decisions made.
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In a pairwise comparison of two models, the one with the lower Schwartz criterion is preferred. Table 9 presents the Schwartz criteria for all models, ranked in order of preference based on the pooled results. The learning models are the clear winners, with the demand-chasing heuristics second, ex post inventory error third, and insufficient adjustment last.
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The time-varying heuristic models are generally preferred to their static counterparts. In addition, the low-and medium-cost rankings are the same as the pooled ranking, while the more parsimonious static-parameter heuristic models are sometimes preferred over their dynamic versions in the high-cost ranking. Also, this ranking indicates that the pull to center in the medium-cost design is not forced by cleverly placing the optimal order quantity at 17 The demand-chasing heuristic requires conditioning on the round-1decision, and so T = 29 in that case. For all other models, the full number of rounds is used.
Since the Schwartz criterion relies heavily on asymptotics, we also estimated the models in a Bayesian setting so that the Bayes Factor criterion could be used. (The Bayes Factor permits an exact likelihood-ratio-type test of nonnested models.) The model rankings were almost identical to those in Table 9. the center of the demand distribution; subjects in that treatment also learn based on experience in a nearly identical way to those in the other two treatments. The null hypothesis of no difference in median residuals is rejected for all models except the learning model with the level-1 prior and the demand-chasing heuristics. To better see the behavior of the error distributions, the cumulative densities of the absolute residuals for each model are plotted in Figure 3 . In this light, it appears that there are three groupings of model performance: (1) the demand-chasing heuristics, (2) the learning models, and (3) the insufficient-adjustment and ex post inventory error heuristics. The preference given to the demand-chasing heuristic is surprising given that the learning models fit better. To verify that this clustering is statistically significant, we conducted the Barrett and Donald (2003) test of first-and second-order stochastic dominance using the residual distributions.
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Recall that first-order stochastic dominance prohibits all crossings of the cumulative density functions; second-order stochastic dominance permits some crossings but still requires one distribution to always possess more cumulative density at any given point. Since the first is quite restrictive and is not likely to hold near the endpoints (residuals are especially clustered in the left tail), we test both orders of dominance. The null hypothesis under the "forward" hypothesis is that a model's residual distribution dominates that of the best-fitting model, i.e., that the best-fitting model's errors are consistently smaller. Since the alternate hypothesis is not necessarily dominance in the reverse direction (neither distribution may dominate the other), the "reverse" test is also conducted to check whether the best-fitting model is actually dominating, i.e., if its residuals are actually larger. Thus, if the learning model with the level-0 prior has consistently smaller residuals, we would expect a failure to reject the null in the forward test and rejection of the null in the reverse test. Table 11 presents In particular, we report the results from their "KSB3" bootstrapping method. The first-order version of the test is essentially the Kolomogorov-Smirnov test of differences in distributions, so the first-order results can be interpreted in that context as well. The dominance result raises the question of why the demand-chasing model ranks worse in log-likelihood terms but appears better in residual terms. One explanation is the differing behavior of these two models for decisions corresponding to the right tail of the error distribution. The cumulative density function of the learning model crosses that of the demandchasing model at an error of about 35 units, and there are some demand-chasing errors in excess of 80 units. The issue is that the demand-chasing model cannot gracefully incorporate subjects who quickly lock onto a strategy and never change it regardless of the demand observations that are realized. For example, one subject in the low-cost treatment always ordered x = 100. For this subject, the demand-chasing model predicts a downward adjustment in every round that never occurs, and some of these prediction errors are quite large. However, since x = 100 has positive expected profit in the low-cost treatment, this decision is accurately predicted by the learning model after the first few rounds because it receives positive, full reinforcement on average while the rest of the choice set is reinforced negligibly.
A second reason the demand-chasing heuristic might have smaller residuals is that its predictions are conditional on the previous order quantity. While this simplification may generate a good round-by-round prediction of order quantities, it does not provide an explanation for how ordering behavior evolves over the course of the experiment. And, because the wholesale cost plays no role in the demand-chasing model, simulations of demand chasing do not show any treatment effect as the cost is changed.
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In contrast, the simulations of the learning model in Tables 1-3 illustrate how each of the parameters can produce the treatment effect that is observed in our experiments.
To illustrate the predictive value of the learning model in these data, the average predicted values for each treatment using the pooled parameter estimates from Table 4 are presented in Figure 4 along with the data averages. The level-0 and level-1 predictions track the observed dynamics in each treatment quite closely; the only material difference between the two occurs in the first few rounds when the level-1 prior pushes the order quantities away from the center. In addition, the learning model tracks the asymmetry pattern in the data.
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To illustrate the marginal contribution of each learning parameter, three similar sets of predictions were generated by fixing one parameter at its rational value while holding the other two at their fitted values. The results of this exercise are shown in Figures 5-7 , which plot the mean predicted order quantities for the fitted model and the restricted models by round and treatment. It appears that the memory bias does not impact the predictions very much, while rationality provides some pull to center in the high-cost treatment. The reinforcement impact, however, is quite pronounced and strongly pulls everything towards the center.
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We do not report these simulations because they are approximately centered about x = 50 for all treatments. They were conducted by drawing from the actual round-1 order quantities and then simulating demands and choices for subsequent rounds. 22 We believe that this asymmetry is an artifact of the actual demand sequences subjects faced, and not an inherent prediction of the learning model. Indeed, the asymmetry in average predictions is not observed when the learning model with these parameters is simulated a very large number of times. 
V. The Effects of Order Frequency
Since other laboratory investigations of the newsvendor game have shown that order frequency affects decisions, we conducted a second experiment in which the order frequency was reduced to once every five rounds. Figure 8 shows the results of this Experiment 2, which was run with different subjects from the same pool. In this design, subjects were still shown the payoff consequences of their decisions on a round-by-round basis, but they could only change their orders in every fifth round. (They were also shown a table with the five most recent payoffs at the time of their decisions.) The purpose of this experiment was to determine whether "tying one's hands" for five periods causes subjects to be less influenced by recent events, so that gains and losses are averaged out. If so, then orders should move towards the optimal quantity. The strong pull-to-center effect in Figure 8 shows that this was not the case in We conducted a third experiment in the same manner as Experiment 2, except that earnings feedback was also shortened to once every five rounds. This change was motivated by the investment study by Bellemare et al. (2004) , who found that an increase in decision frequency alone was not enough to influence risk-taking behavior. However, an increase in feedback frequency, holding decision frequency constant, had a large effect on the amount of myopic loss aversion implied by investment behavior.
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Thus, in addition to tying subjects' hands for five rounds, our third design imposes a complete five-round perspective on each decision. Figure 9 shows the results for our Experiment 3, which again exhibits a strong pull-to- This difference is significant for the low-cost treatment (p < 0.05), but it implies larger deviations from the optimum upon reducing the decision frequency. Several papers have addressed the relative effects of decision and information frequency in risky investment decisions. Langer and Weber (2005) report that the effect of commitment length is stronger than the effect of feedback frequency, and that there is some interaction effect between the two. Fellner and Sutter (2005) also find the effects of investment frequency to be at least as large as those of feedback frequency.
Experiment 1 and at rounds 1, 6, 11, etc. for Experiment 3. There is no clear pattern of divergence between these, which suggests that the stronger pull-to-center effect in the five-round treatment is due to the fact that there were fewer chances to learn and adapt when decisions were made less frequently. The parameter estimates presented in this section are somewhat sensitive to the choice of aggregator function. The median and various weighted-average schemes were explored as alternative aggregators, but the mean consistently performed best in log-likelihood terms.
The eight models can be applied to Experiment 3 by replacing t with t′. Table 12 presents the results of estimating the learning models with the five-round aggregated data. The memory estimates are quite similar to their Experiment 1 counterparts.
However, the effect of changing from the level-0 to the level-1 prior is pronounced: pushing the initial decisions away from the center of the demand distribution via the level-1 assumption generates greater reinforcement bias and less rationality, and the fit is improved in three of four cases. Somewhat counterintuitively, this implies that the level-0 assumption in this case incorrectly generates smaller learning biases, even though the initial predictions from this model are more distant from the optimal order quantities. But, the exceedingly small magnitude of the log-likelihood improvement suggests that any statistical identification of a difference between the two assumptions is tenuous. The most interesting result is the reduction in the reinforcement bias over Experiment 1: the pooled estimates of r = 0.51 for the level-0 prior and r = 0.66 for the level-1 prior are smaller than the Experiment 1 estimate of about 0.75. This indicates that subjects do indeed consider more closely the profits for the entire demand interval when they make decisions that bind for five rounds, so imposing a five-round view of the problem appears to partially mitigate one dimension of the pull-to-center effect. However, the memory bias (in the time scale of decisions) is about the same, so subjects forget past results at the same rate regardless of the decision frequency. Thus, subjects are still exhibiting decision bias in this setting. The estimates of the Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) heuristics are presented in Tables 13-15 . All of the biases and adjustment rates are magnified from their counterparts in Experiment 1.
For example, the pooled insufficient-adjustment estimates α and α 1 are smaller than the corresponding estimates in Experiment 1 while the estimate of ∆ α is larger, implying that this bias is initially stronger in Experiment 3 but disappears at a faster rate (in the time scale of decisions). A similar intuition can be found in the estimates for the demand-chasing heuristic, which imply greater adjustment towards the most recent demand but also more rapid disappearance of this demand-chasing behavior. These results suggest that the initial decisions in Experiment 3 are more biased than those in Experiment 1, but that the amount of learning on a decision-to-decision basis is greater in Experiment 3. This is not entirely surprising, because one decision interval in Experiment 3 contains five times as much information than a decision interval in Experiment 1. In addition, this evolution of bias is consistent with the reduced value of r in the learning model: increased reinforcement makes the attractiveness of counterfactual choices relatively higher, which results in relatively "more accurate" attractions as additional decisions are made. The results from the ex post inventory error model are somewhat enigmatic given these results, as the bias is essentially flat in the pooled estimates.
We emphasize that although learning occurs faster in the time scale of decisions in Experiment 3, this does not translate into faster learning on a round-by-round basis. For example, after 6 decisions or 30 rounds, the time-varying insufficient-adjustment parameter in Experiment 3 stands at 0.5. The corresponding value after 30 rounds in Experiment 1 is about 0.7, so clearly the subjects in Experiment 3 have learned less by round 30 than those in Experiment 1. A similar intuition holds for the other models. The Schwartz criteria for these models are presented in Table 16 . Since the number of subjects and the number of decisions are much smaller than in Experiment 1 (348 decisions versus 2460 decisions), more parsimonious models are more likely to be chosen. In this case, the demand-chasing heuristic comes out ahead, with the learning models second and the insufficientadjustment and ex post inventory error heuristics third. Since simulations of the demand-chasing heuristic (discussed in footnote 21) are clustered about x = 50 as are these data, this ranking is not entirely surprising. Similarly to Table 10, Table 17 presents summary statistics for the residuals of each model. In this case, there is no statistically discernible difference in median residuals between the best-fitting model (dynamic demand chasing) and any of the other models.
However, Figure 11 and Table 18 provide some evidence of a difference in the residuals. Based on the magnitude of residuals, there appears to be the same grouping of models as in Experiment 1; however, the distinction between the learning models and the third cluster of models is not as sharp. The stochastic-dominance tests indicate that residuals from the dynamic version of the demand-chasing heuristic are generally smaller than those from all other versions except the static version of demand chasing. This alternative ranking of models raises the question of which to put more confidence in, the ranking from Experiment 1 or Experiment 3. Since Schwartz criterion's penalty for small datasets is quite high, we are more inclined to favor the former, which is based on seven times as many decisions. And, as noted earlier, the demand-chasing model is not sensitive to changes in the wholesale cost across treatments. While the demand-chasing heuristic may fit better in this case, it cannot explain the strong treatment effects observed in other experiments.
Conclusion
The newsvendor problem has fascinated decision theorists because it generates regular deviations from optimal behavior that cannot be explained by risk or loss aversion. In particular, orders are too low in high-profit-margin settings, and orders are too high in low-profit-margin settings. We have replicated this pull-to-center effect in laboratory experiments. A design with doubled payoffs also shows a pull to center, indicating that payoff insensitivity is not a sufficient explanation of our results. The effect is just strong when decisions are made at five-round intervals, a change which leads to more of a long-run perspective on round-by-round losses and gains. In these experiments, subjects in the low-decision-frequency treatment behave like inexperienced decision makers from the high-decision-frequency treatment: the six five-round decisions from the low-frequency treatment are similar to the first six one-round decisions from the high-frequency treatment.
An examination of individual decisions shows that subjects do respond to recent gains and losses, but that inertia often sets in. Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) identified three heuristics that had the potential to explain key features of their data: anchoring on mean demand with insufficient adjustment, minimizing anticipated ex post inventory error, and demand chasing. We estimate models based on each of these heuristics. The Schwartz criterion indicates that our learning model, which addresses some aspects of the heuristics and some aspects of bounded rationality, is preferred. An alternative analysis based on residuals suggests that the demand-chasing heuristic usually generates smaller prediction errors. The demand-chasing model, however, has no role for the wholesale cost or other features of the payoff structure, so it cannot explain the most salient feature of the data averages, the treatment effects. The learning model with recency effects incorporates demand chasing in a framework where expected payoffs also matter. The predictions from the learning model correlate strongly with predictions from all of the heuristic models, indicating that the learning model detects the essences of these heuristics.
In our model, after observing a demand realization, decision makers consider the counterfactual profits that would have resulted from ordering each of the possible quantities.
The counterfactual profit function peaks at the actual demand realization, and has downward slopes on each side that depend on the magnitudes of the economic incentives (profit margin and order cost). There is one particularly focal point on this function, the point corresponding to the actual quantity ordered in a decision period. This order quantity is fully reinforced, while the others in the choice set that were not selected are only reinforced by a fraction. The subjective attractiveness of each order quantity is determined by a weighted average of the current and past reinforced counterfactual profits, where the weights depend on a memory parameter. The attraction weights are finally translated into logit choice probabilities for the next decision.
Parameter estimates for the logit rationality, reinforcement, and memory parameters are highly significant, and the resulting predictions track the observed pull-to-center and asymmetric adjustment patterns closely.
Our model can be extended to incorporate features of other newsvendor designs. For example, using the extension of experience-weighted attraction to extensive-form games that is described by Camerer and Anderson (2000) , one can conceivably model a multistage newsvendor game such as that of Croson and Donohoe (2006) . This could lend additional insight into the behavioral causes of their "bullwhip effect" (the tendency for order variability to increase down the supply chain), such as whether recency, reinforcement, rationality, or some combination of these biases are most relevant, and at which stage of the chain. We have also illustrated in this article how to evaluate decision-frequency designs such as those of Bolton and Katok (forthcoming).
One intriguing feature of our data that we have not yet been able to capture with our learning model is the asymmetry in the pull-to-center effect. Upon examining the data plots and tables from Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) and Lurie and Swaminathan (2007) , we found that the the former show an asymmetry identical to ours while the latter show a reverse asymmetry (i.e., faster convergence in the high-cost treatment). Although the predictions from the fitted learning model track our asymmetric data fairly well, the asymmetry disappears under repeated simulations of the model, and so we believe the current form of our model does not have an asymmetry as a limiting result. We view exploration of the asymmetry as the most interesting line of inquiry for future newsvendor experiments and modeling of experimental data. As shown by Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) , the behavioral elements that are most likely to apply in a lowprofit setting (e.g., loss and risk aversion) pull the model's predictions for the high-cost treatment in the opposite direction from the data. Thus, the behavioral process underlying the asymmetry is likely to be more nuanced than a risk attitudes over payoffs, which could be easily introduced into our framework. In addition, an experimental design specifically targeted towards magnifying this asymmetry would be helpful in order to confirm the stability of the asymmetry.
